1.Performance Level
The Performance Level (PL) is also defined as a measure of the reliability of a given safety function. A hazardous situation for the operation of machines has been classified according to five levels of safety. Starting from "PL a" (low) to the level "PL e" (high). The required safety level PL, in accordance with EN ISO 134849-1, is calculated and defined as part of the risk assessment [4] .
The performance level PL is determined by means of individual structures using the following parameters, i.e.: -category, structural requirements (Category, SRP / CS architecture); -mean time until a dangerous failure of each control subsystem (MTTFd: Meantime to dangerous failure); -diagnostic coverage (DC: Diagnostic coverage); -common cause failure (CCF: Common cause failure).
1.1.Category, structural requirements (Category; SRP/CS architecture)
The EN ISO 13849-1 standard lists categories (table 1) and presents examples of structures illustrated in the form of diagrams (Figure 1-4) [4] . These schemes are called simplified reliability block diagrams. An important task in assessing the security of the industrial automation system is to assign the actual structure to a specific category.
Tab. 1. Determining the system category [4] Category System behavior B A fault can lead to loss of security 1
As in category B, but the probability of a fault is lower than in category B. 2
A fault can lead to the loss of the safety function between two periodic inspections and the loss of the safety function is detected by the control system in the next test. 3 In the event of a single fault, the safety function is always met.
Only some faults will be detected. The loss of safety function may occur after accumulation of undetected faults. 4 When failures occur, the safety function is always met. Faults will be detected in a timely manner to overcome the loss of the safety function.
Fig. 1. Category B (own study based on [4])
The single-channel structure in a typical arrangement ( Fig. 1 ) includes a sensor (Input), a logic part (Logic) and an actuator (Output).
Fig. 2. Category 2 (own study based on [4])
A single-channel structure consisting of a sensor (Input), a logic part (Logic), an actuator (Output), an additional external monitoring system (Test equipment), and output of test equipment. Category 3 and 4 are characterized by a two-track (redundant) structure. This means that there is a sensor, a logic part and an actuator in each channel. Categories have additional track monitoring functions as well as mutual track monitoring. 
Mean time to dangerous failure of each control subsystem (MTTFd)
MTTFd parameter informs about the amount of time that middlingly elapses between further dangerous damages of components. The value of MTTFd is calculated with taking into account the type of subsystem and it is qualitative definition of safety function.
For the estimation of the MTTFd of each control channel (subsystem), one of the procedures shall be used in the order given: -use manufacturer's data; -use methods described in table C included in EN ISO 13849-1 [4] ; -choose 10 years of use.
In case the manufacturer does not provide the MTTFd value then table C included in EN ISO13849-1 [4] presents four methods for calculating MTTFd for individual parts [7] :
Analyzing the first method one can see in table C typical MTTFd values (in years) for mechanical and hydraulic parts. In the second method for hydraulic parts, with appropriate assumptions, a specific value of 150 years is indicated. In the third method in which we deal with mechanical, pneumatic and electromechanical parts, MTTFd is determined from the following formula: 
where:
T10d -time until 10% of the components fail dangerously;
The calculation of MTTFd for electronic components based on fourth method is made on the basis of MTTFd values contained in the tables for the elements from which the formula is created:
where: N -number of elements.
The mean time MTTFd is divided into three ranges and is summarized in Table 2 .
Tab. 2. Determining the system category [4]
Index Range MTTFd Low 3 years ≤MTTFd< 10 years Medium 10 years ≤MTTFd< 30 years High 30 years ≤MTTFd< 100 years
1.3.Diagnostic Coverage (DC)
Diagnostic coverage is a measure of the number of dangerous failures detected by the diagnostic system. Diagnostic coverage reduces the likelihood of dangerous hardware failures thanks to automatic diagnostic tests. They are determined according to the following formula:
where: λDD-the probability of a detected dangerous failure; λDtotal-the probability of total dangerous failures; 
where: d1, d2, dn represent the separate SRP / CS parts The calculated diagnostic coverage assumes the ranges included in the Table 3 1.4.Common cause failure CCF parameter defines persistence of the system on occurrences which makes simultaneous failures of two or more separate channels in multichannel's systems which in consequence may guide to failure in function connected with safety. Table 4 presents measures and requirements for protection against this type of damage. When a precautionary measure is applied to the subsystem, the total number of points is allocated. The CCF test is only valid for categories 2, 3, 4. Resistance to CCF is appropriate if the sum of points is greater than or equal to 65. 
Designation of the PL for the subsystem and system
Once all the parameters have been determined, you define the PL of the subsystem based on Figure 6 . If there is a need for a more accurate reading of the value, we use table No. 6, which takes into account the additional parameter PFHd (Probability of a dangerous failure per hour). The PL of the entire system is determined by tables 5 and 6. If the obtained PL is greater than or equal to that required for the PLr function, it is assumed that the given safety system meets the requirements.
Tab.5. Probability of a dangerous failure per hour [4]
Performance Level
Probability of a dangerous failure per hour (PFHd) [1/h] a ≥10 -5 and <10 -4 〈0.001% to 0.01%〉 b ≥3 × 10 -6 and <10 -5 〈0.0003% to 0.001%〉 c ≥10 -6 and <3 × 10 -6 〈0.0001% to 0.0003%〉 d ≥10 -7 and <10 -6 〈0.00001% to 0.0001%〉 e ≥10 -8 and <10 -7 〈0.000001% to 0.00001%> Tab.6. Designation of the PL of the system based on knowledge of the PL of the subsystems [4] Lowest PL of subsystem Number of subsystems having the following PL => Maximum possible
=> e
1.6.Validation of the PL
The aim of validation is counterchecking if the SRECS safety system fulfills given it requirements contained in SRCF specification.
All requirements for running category validation are included in EN ISO 13849-2 [21] , more precisely: [3] requirements relating to the precise level of security assurance; -requirements for specifying categories in accordance with the standard, Documentation for validation should come from the project and be verified and validated in order to give an opinion on the design of the machine in question. The Validation should be prepared on the basis of prepared safety plan. The validation protocol should contain information pertinent to the course of the validation process, the criteria of mistakes removal and report from the conducted research. If   Fig. 6 . Relationship -PL and Cat, DC, MTTFd. (Own study based on [18] ) any defects are noted in the documentation, it is returned to the person preparing it. The above-described process is repeated for each of the safety functions.
2.Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
Safety integrity level (SIL), is a measure of the safety of electrical, electronic and mechanical devices, and it may also refer to software. SIL is determined on the basis of EN 62061 [6] or EN IEC 61508 [5] , which contain a methodology for testing whether selected control system structures meet defined safety requirements. The EN 62061 standard defines SIL in 3 levels 1-3, where 3 is the highest level. The use of SIL means that a cyclic control is carried out, which includes elements such as: procedures of conduct, connection diagrams, and for risk assessment -information on failure rates justified by inspections. The risk assessment supported by SIL is a qualitative assessment.
The EN IEC 61508 standard defines two types of systems [5] : Systems operating On-demand, occasionally (low functional load). Low probability of system malfunction while handling the request; Systems operating continuously or frequently (high functional load). There is a probability of dangerous damage per hour. Obtaining the necessary level of safety integrity for the industrial automation system takes place in five stages. First step involves assigning SIL and determining the structure of the SRECS (Safety Related Electrical Control System). The estimation of the required SIL level is performed for each dangerous occurrence with the breakdown into the parameters included in Fig. 7.   Fig.7 . Risk estimation according to EN ISO 62061 [6] The severity of injuries or damage to health can be portrayed by taking into account reversible, irreversible injuries and death. The injury score is presented in Table 7 . Tab. 7. "Injury severity score (Se)" according to EN ISO 62061 [6] Consequences Severity (Se) Irreversible: death, loss of the eye or arm 4 Irreversible: limb fractures, loss of fingers 3 Reversible: medical personel required 2 Reversible: first aid required 1
When specifying Fr, we pay attention to aspects such as: -Frequency of staying in the danger zone in different operating modes (normal operation, preservation, cleaning); -What types of tasks are performed. When discussing the probability of a dangerous event, we must consider two basic concepts:
-Predictability of hazardous elements in different parts of the machine in different modes of operation; -Behavior of people interacting with the machine such as stress, fatigue, lack of experience. The Av parameter is connected with machine construction and has been classified by three variants presented in the Table 10 .
Tab.10. "Probability of avoiding or limiting harm (Av) Classification" according to EN ISO 62061 [6] Probability of avoiding or limiting harm (Av) Impossible 5 Rare 3 Probable 1
For each severity level Se, the loss probability class Cl is calculated using the following relationship:
The SIL estimation is made using the following Function blocks are created owing to a detailed division of the safety functions. (Figure 8 ) Next step covers the exchange of security requirements for each function block and the allocation of blocks to the subsystem in architecture ( Figure 9 ). Failure of any subsystem will lead to failure of the safety related control function. Fig. 9 . Assignment of function blocks (own study based on [20] ) In this step it is significant to make selection of components for each of the subsystems (Figure 10 ). According to EN ISO 62061 [6] , the last matter to do is designing the diagnostic function. SIL subsystems are created on the basis of chosen architecture. There are four basic subsystems architecture: Fig. 11 . Subsystem architecture type A [6] The simplest architecture of subsystem is a single channel without any diagnostic function.
where: -intensity of subsystem's dangerous damage;
1 -dangerous damage's stream of the 1 element of subsystem. 
= * 1ℎ where: β -vulnerability to damage that is caused by a common cause. Fig. 13 . Subsystem architecture type C [6] Subsystem architecture type C shows functional representation of the fault tolerant system with diagnostic function. Diagnostic coverage is used to reduce the likelihood of a dangerous hardware failure. Diagnostic tests are performed automatically [16] .
where: DC1 -diagnostic coverage of subsystem element 1.
Fig. 14. Subsystem architecture type D [6]
The last subsystem D is a parallel connection of two elements and additionally has a diagnostic function.
The elements of the subsystem characterized by a different construction describes equation number 12 whereas the elements of the subsystem characterized by the same construction describes equation number 13.
Summary
The safety of industrial automation systems is becoming a subject of growing interest. Therefore, it is important to develop methods 
Where: T2 -clearance between testing tests T1 -gap between periodic testing tests or time of life (for calculations it is important to assume lower value)
